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Combining information from the Firm Survey of Labor Costs with the information about 
claims filed with the Guarantee Fund by workers whose employers defaulted on their 
severance pay obligations, the paper analyzes the so-called non-performance problem of 
severance pay – the fact that coverage, and thus legal entitlement, does not guarantee the 
actual receipt of the benefit – as experienced in Slovenia in 2000.  The findings are 
threefold: (i) one-third of total obligations incurred by firms failed to be honored and only 
a small portion of defaulted severance pay claims was reimbursed by the Guarantee Fund; 
(ii) while both men and women seem to be equally affected, workers older than 40 were 
disproportionally represented among those whose severance pay claims failed to be 
honored; and, (iii) among firms that incurred severance pay liabilities, larger and more 
productive firms were more likely to observe their fiduciary obligations and pay them out. 
These findings corroborate the weaknesses of severance pay as an income protection 
program, pointing to the large scale of the non-performance problem and the inequities 
created by it.  
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1  Introduction 
 
Being widely used in both the developed and developing world, severance pay is the most 
prevalent program offering income compensation in the case of job loss.
1 Despite being so 
widespread, evaluations show that severance pay not only creates important inefficiencies 
but also often fails to provide adequate protection. On the efficiency front, severance pay 
reduces employment and labor market flows, hinders technological progress and 
innovations, pushes workers into the informal sector, and creates significant litigation 
costs (see Addison and Teixeira (2001) for a review of both theoretical and empirical 
effects). Its scorecard on the income protection front is also rather negative. First, 
generous severance pay hinders access to formal sector jobs by disadvantaged groups 
(OECD 1999). Second, the same amount of severance is paid regardless of the duration of 
the unemployment spell following the separation, resulting in over-payments to workers 
with short and under-payments to workers with long unemployment spells. And third, 
severance pay suffers from the so-called non-performance problem – the fact that 
coverage, and thus legal entitlement, does not guarantee the actual receipt of the benefit.  
  
The non-performance of severance pay is largely an “uncharted territory,” as only a 
handful of studies provide hard empirical evidence about this aspect of severance pay. 
Because severance is not administered by a public authority, information about the 
incidence of severance pay obligations as well as about how frequently firms actually 
honor such obligations is rarely accessible. While ad-hoc evidence exists (for example, 
from litigation cases where workers are suing their employers for the non-payment of 
severance pay), we are familiar with only two studies that report evidence on non-
performance–based on micro-data. One is MacIsaac and Rama (2000), who estimate that 
in the early 1990s only about half of Peruvian workers legally entitled to severance pay 
received the benefit (MacIsaac and Rama report that the payment was more likely if 
workers had a written contract and if they worked in a large, unionized firm that paid 
social security contributions). The other is Mansor et al. (2001), who report that Malaysian 
workers who were laid off in 1998 received 83 percent of the total amount of severance 
pay that they claimed from their employers.  
 
This paper is an attempt to provide further insights into the non-performance problem of 
the severance pay. It focuses on the Slovenian severance pay program and addresses the 
following three sets of questions: 
 
(a) How severe is the non-performance problem in Slovenia? That is, of total liabilities 
arising from the payment of severance, what are (i) the share of severance pay paid 
out by firms, (ii) the share paid out by the Guarantee Fund of Slovenia, and (iii) the 
share that is failed to be paid out?  
 
(b) In particular, are any groups strongly affected? That is, what is the age and sex 
composition of workers whose severance pay claims are not honored?  
 
(c) What are the characteristics of the firms that honor their obligations arising from 
severance pay in comparison to those that fail to do so?   
 
                                                 
1 See Holzmann et al (2008) for a survey of the incidence of the severance pay around the world and a 
review of the origin, economic rationale, and current attempts to reform severance pay programs.   2
Because of information availability, Slovenia is particularly suitable for studying the 
above questions. First, in 2000 the Statistical Office of Slovenia carried out a survey of 
labor costs incurred by firms, the survey that among others provides information about the 
amount of severance paid out by each firm. Second, Slovenia is one of few transition 
countries that has introduced the Guarantee Fund to help the laid-off workers with partial 
reimbursement of their outstanding severance pay claims, and the information collected by 
this fund is a valuable source for studying severance pay non-performance.
2 These two 
sources – the Firm Survey of Labor Costs and the Guarantee Fund – are thus 
complementary, one providing information about severance pay obligations paid out by 
firms and the other about obligations failed to be paid out by firms. Taken together, the 
data establish a composite rendering of fulfilled and unfulfilled severance pay obligations 
in Slovenia. 
 
The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, the non-performance of severance pay 
has been a significant problem in Slovenia, with one-third of total obligations incurred by 
firms failing to be honored (in 2000, the year focused upon by the study) and only a small 
portion of non-paid severance pay claims being reimbursed by the Guarantee Fund. 
Second, while both men and women seem to be equally affected, workers older than 40 
were disproportionally represented among those whose severance pay claims failed to be 
honored. And third, among firms that incurred severance pay liabilities, larger and more 
productive firms were more likely to pay them out. These findings corroborate the 
weaknesses of severance pay as an income protection program, pointing to the large scale 
of the non-performance problem and inequities created by it.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the legal framework of severance 
pay in Slovenia. Section 3 provides a comparison of severance pay programs in transition 
countries. Section 4 describes the data and methodology, and Section 5 presents the results 
of the empirical analysis of the non-performance problem of the Slovenian severance pay 
program. Section 6 concludes with a summary and policy implications. 
 
2  Description of the legal system of Slovenia’s severance pay 
 
In Slovenia, severance pay is regulated by the Labor Code, the Law on the Public 
Guarantee Fund, and the Law on Bankruptcy and Liquidation, and is further guided by 
Collective bargaining agreements, as well as individual contracts (on the managerial 
level). Mandated severance pay is paid to laid-off workers and workers who retire, with 
the level of pay proportional to the work tenure of the worker with his or her former 
employer. To address the non-performance problem of severance pay, a Guarantee Fund 
was introduced in 1997, with the Fund partly reimbursing the unpaid severance pay claims 
of workers. 
 
Slovenia introduced a Labor Code in 1990 and a new one in 2003. The 1990 Labor Code 
mandated severance for early retirees as well as for redundant workers. While for early 
retirees the law did not prescribe the amount of severance pay, it did so for redundant 
workers. For each year of service, workers with at least two years of service were entitled 
to half of their monthly average wage for every year of service, with the wage determined 
on the basis the wage paid in the last three months of employment. Other cases for 
severance pay were not legally binding.  
                                                 
2 Guarantee Fund also exists in Estonia, Romania and Uzbekistan.   3
 
The 2003 Labor Code significantly differs from the previous one, by defining more 
precisely the obligations on the part of employers and the rights of workers. Workers are 
entitled to severance pay if they retire or they are dismissed (either because of business 
reasons or bankruptcy or even in the case of his/her incompetence). Retired workers are 
entitled to the severance pay of two average wages, calculated from three-months average 
wage in Slovenia, or (if more favorable to the employee) two average wages, calculated 
from his/her three-months average wage before retirement. In contrast, the basis for the 
calculation of the severance pay for dismissed workers is the average monthly wage which 
was received by the employee, or which would have been received by the worker if 
working, in the last three months before the termination is taken. The employee is entitled 
to severance pay amounting to: 
 
•  1/5 of the basis for each year of employment with the employer, if the employee 
has been employed with the employer for more than one and up to five years; 
 
•  1/4 of the basis for each year of employment with the employer, if the employee 
has been employed with the employer for the period from five to fifteen years; 
 
•  1/3 of the basis for each year of employment with the employer, if the employee 
has been employed with the employer for the period exceeding fifteen years. 
 
It is worthwhile to stress that also under the 2003 law, the severance pay program remains 
unrelated to the unemployment insurance program. That is, qualifying workers receive 
severance pay and, in addition, they also qualify for unemployment insurance benefits 
(which can be received for up to two years, see van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006). 
 
To protect worker’s rights in the case of a firm’s insolvency, in 1997 Slovenia – following 
the 1980 EU directive 80/987 – introduced the Public Guarantee Fund. Workers, legally 
entitled to severance pay but unsuccessful in its exaction, can claim partial reimbursement 
of their severance pay claims from the Fund, with the ceiling on such reimbursements 
being a monthly minimum wage.
3  Moreover, under the 1993 Law on Bankruptcy and 
Liquidation, workers can sue their former employers that undergo a liquidation or 
bankruptcy process, with workers’ severance pay claims having a priority before other 
claims  (up to a limit – for details, see Kresal Šoltes 1997). 
 
3  Review of severance pay program in transition countries 
 
In putting Slovenia in an international context, we draw heavily on the Schwab (2003) 
analysis of 21 transition countries.
4 While all these countries mandate severance pay, the 
countries differ in important details. These include the extent of coverage, eligibility 
                                                 
3 Under the 1993 Law on Bankruptcy and Liquidation, workers can sue their former employers that undergo 
a liquidation or bankruptcy process, with workers’ severance pay claims having a priority before other 
claims  (up to a limit – for details, see Kresal Šoltes 1997). 
4 Three socialist countries (China, North Korea, and Vietnam); eight successor countries of USSR 
(Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine); five successor countries 
of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slovenia); two 
successor countries of Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic and Slovak Republic), and three former socialist 
European countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland).   4
conditions, generosity of benefits and whether benefits should vary with seniority, and 
what to do when bankruptcy prevents the employer from making severance payments.  
 
Eligibility. Transition countries mandate severance pay for economic dismissals such as 
the employer’s liquidation, bankruptcy, or reduction of staff due to economic, 
technological, structural, or similar changes.
5 Many countries require severance pay only 
for economic dismissals. These countries include the Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, 
Macedonia, Poland, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Vietnam. In some other 
countries, though, workers are also entitled to severance pay for a variety of other 
dismissals. These other dismissals are generally for individual reasons, such as when the 
worker proves incompetent for the position or is disabled by health reasons.  
 
Not all dismissed workers, even among those dismissed for economic reasons, are entitled 
to severance payments. Countries differ in eligibility conditions. One-third of the countries 
included in our analysis require a minimum length of employment with the firm before a 
dismissed worker is entitled to severance pay. The required seniority ranges from one to 
three years for economic dismissals, and up to five years for other dismissals. Slovenia 
and Vietnam require one year of employment before a worker is entitled to severance pay. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia require two years of seniority. Hungary 
requires three years of seniority. Bulgaria requires five year of seniority before a worker is 
entitled to severance pay for dismissals due to illness (but has no seniority requirements 
for economic dismissals).  
 
Level of benefits. Of the 21 countries included in our analysis, 13 use a sliding scale 
connected to years of employment – Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, North Korea, Poland, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, and 
Vietnam; severance pay in the rest of the countries included in the study does not vary 
with seniority. By design, in sliding-scale countries more senior workers are entitled to 
more generous severance pay. In general, the level of benefits in sliding-scale countries 
exceeds those in fixed-benefit countries.  
 
Dealing with the non-performance problem. A major issue connected with severance pay 
is inability of insolvent employers to make severance payments. Fifteen countries have 
ratified ILO Convention 173, including four transition countries: Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. According to this convention, countries can choose between 
giving priority to severance pay claims in the employer’s bankruptcy proceedings or 
creating a Guarantee Fund to protect severance-pay claims (together with unpaid wages) – 
with Slovenia, as mentioned above, opting for both.  
 
4  Data and methodology 
 
Below we describe the micro-level data sources and methodology used in the empirical 
analysis of Slovenia’s severance pay.  
 
                                                 
5 Most OECD countries also have mandatory severance pay programs, but some – including Australia, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States – 
leave such arrangements to collective bargaining or rely on the common law provisions. For example, in the 
Netherlands, even though the law does not require severance pay, employers often make payments to 
dismissed workers to avoid legal proceedings for an “obviously unreasonable dismissal.” The cantonal 
courts have even created a statutory-like formula for the amount of severance payments.   5
Data sources. The following data sources are used: 
 
(a) Firm-level data were obtained from the 2000 Labor Costs Survey in Slovenia, 
administered by the Statistical Office of Slovenia. The sample comprised 3,021 
enterprises, selected among those with 10 or more workers. Information included 
severance pay that firms paid both to laid-off and retired workers. 
 
(b) Individual-level data were gathered from worker requests to the Guarantee Fund of 
Slovenia in the period from 1994 to 2003. For each individual, data included 
unpaid severance pay obligations, requested amount from the Fund, amount paid 
by the Fund, the gender and age of the applicant, and previous employer. 
 
(c) Firm-level measure of efficiency produced by production function estimation. We 
used the value of the error term – εijt – for 2000, obtained by the following OLS 
estimation of translog production function for the Slovenian manufacturing firms 
for the 1994-2001 period: 
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where the inputs xijkt include measures of labor, capital, and material inputs; αk and βkl 
are, respectively, first- and second-order translog production parameters (i refers to 
individual firms, j to two-digit industry categories, and t to time) – see Orazem and 
Vodopivec (2008) for details of estimation and data sources used.
6 
 
Methodology for the analysis of firm-level determinants of severance pay payout. To 
investigate whether firm efficiency and size affect the likelihood of paying severance pay 
given that firms incurred such costs, that is, that they laid-off workers, we ran a 
multinomial logit model with the following options for the dependent variable:  
-  firm did not incur severance obligations (taken as a baseline), 
-  firm incurred severance obligations and paid them, and  
-  firm incurred severance obligations and did not pay them. 
 
As explanatory variables, we used efficiency of the firm and firm size. To capture firm 
size effects, we used a dummy variable indicating whether a firm had more than 100 
workers.  
 
5  Empirical results 
 
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis of the severance pay non-
performance in Slovenia. As explained above, we focus on the following aspects: the 
severity of the non-performance problem, the composition of workers whose severance 
pay claims fail to be paid out, and the characteristics of firms that fail to pay their 
severance pay obligations.   
 
To put these questions in the context, however, let us first present statistics about 
severance pay liabilities that were paid out. We focus on year 2000, the year for which we 
                                                 
6 Alternative measures of efficiency, obtained via fixed effects and  random  effects  estimation  of  the  above 
translog production function, yielded similar results. 
   6
have Labor Cost Survey data. First, the overall amount of severance pay liabilities paid out 
in 2000 was €17.5 million – 0.085 percent of GDP or 0.2 percent of the total wage bill. 
While this is a rather modest amount, it certainly is not a negligible one. Second, most of 
severance pay obligations was paid by large firms; for example, 93 percent of severance 
pay was paid out by firms with more than 30 workers (see Figure 1). Third, the majority 
(more than 60 percent) of paid severance pay obligations was incurred in manufacturing 
(Figure 2), suggesting that in 2000, this sector was still undergoing an intense 
restructuring. 
 










Source: Authors’ computations based on the 2000 Labor Cost Survey. 
 










































































































































Source: Authors’ computations based on the 2000 Labor Cost Survey. 
 
(a) Severity of severance pay non-performance  
 
Our results show that in 2000, the non-performance of severance pay posed a serious 
problem in Slovenia. Out of the total of €27.3 million severance pay obligations, €9.0 
million – 33 percent – failed to be honored (by firms that incurred these obligations or by 
the Guarantee Fund – see Table 1). The role of the Guarantee Fund in helping with unpaid 
obligations proved to be very limited, as the Fund only reimbursed €0.7 million or 7.2 
percent of total unpaid severance pay obligations.
7 Indeed, according to its rules (see 
above), the Guarantee Fund reimbursed unpaid severance pay claims only partially, and so 
less than 10 percent of the average claim was actually reimbursed (see Figure 3). 
 
                                                 
7 It is possible that some workers received additional reimbursement from bankruptcy or liquidation 
proceeds – we do not have any information about such reimbursements.   7











Payments made by firms    17.5    64.3    0.085    0.162 
Reimbursements made by the Guarantee Fund     0.7    2.7    0.004    0.007 
Unpaid severance pay claims     9.0    33.0    0.044    0.083 
Total    27.3   100.0   0.132   0.252 
Source: Authors’ computations based on 2000 Labor Costs Survey and the Guarantee Fund of Slovenia.  
 















Source: Authors’ computations based on information provided by the Guarantee Fund of Slovenia. 
 
In the 1990s, the magnitude of the non-performance of severance pay was most likely 
even larger. Figure 4 shows the number of cases of severance pay reimbursements by the 
Guarantee Fund in the period from 1994 until 2003. This figure reflects the pattern of 
transition and suggests that the problem of severance pay non-performance was probably 
even more serious in the mid-1990s, when the number of workers turning to the Guarantee 
Fund for reimbursements was more than double the number in 2000. Moreover, in the 
period from 1994 to 2003 around 43,000 workers failed to receive payment from their 
former employers despite their legal entitlement.  
 












1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 
Source: The Guarantee Fund of Slovenia. 
 
(b) Which workers are affected by non-performance of severance pay? 
 
To find out whether some groups of workers were disproportionally affected by severance 
pay non-performance, we analyzed the composition of workers reporting unpaid severance   8
claims. We found no evidence of differences between men and women, but workers above 
40 years were more affected by severance pay non-performance than younger workers.  
 
Figure 5 shows that severance pay non-performance has not affected men and women 
differently, as the reimbursements to men and women were rather similar in size. Over the 
1994-2003 period, the Guarantee Fund paid 50.8 percent of total severance pay 
reimbursements to women and 49.2 percent to men), which correspond well to the 
employment shares of these groups (in 2000, men represented 51 percent of total 
employment and women 49 percent).  
 












1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Male Female
 
Source: The Guarantee Fund of Slovenia. 
 
Turning to age distribution of claimants, Figure 6 compares the age distribution of 
severance pay claimants with the age distribution of the active population in Slovenia in 
the same period (1994-2003). Clearly, among the claimants, workers over 40 years of age 
are over-represented – while their share in population is 47 percent and 42 percent for men 
and women, respectively, their share among the claimants is 64 percent and 51percent for 
men and women, respectively.  
 
Figure 6: Age distribution of claimants and active population in Slovenia in 1994-
2003 


































































     Source: The Guarantee Fund of Slovenia. 
 
(c) Firm characteristics and non-performance 
 
The last part of our analysis sheds light on characteristics of firms that are paying out 
severance pay in comparison to those that are failing to honor their legal entitlements. The   9
estimation of the multinominal logit model (see Table 2) shows that the larger and the 
more productive the firm, the more likely it is that it honors its severance pay obligations.  
 
 
Table 2: Multinomial logit estimates of the likelihood of severance pay non-
performance 
  Multinomial logit estimates  Descriptive statistics
§ 
  Paying severance  
obligations 












Efficiency of the firm       -0.04  0.49  -5.76**  2.17  0.07  0.21 
Size of the firm (1 if 
firm’ employment 
exceeds 100 workers, 
0 otherwise) 
1.38**  0.28 0.47 0.88 0.61  0.49 
Constant -286**  0.25  -5.35**  0.81     




The definition of dependent variable: not incurring severance obligations is taken as a baseline, and 
incurring severance obligations and paying them, and incurring severance obligations and failing to pay 
them, as other options. 
§ Mean value of dependent variable is 0/08, and its standard error is 0.27. 
§§ Significance at 1 and 5 percent levels are indicated by ‘**’ and ‘*’, respectively. 
 
6  Concluding remarks 
 
Being one of the rare examples of its kind, the paper seeks to provide insights into the 
non-performance problem of severance pay by analyzing the working of this program in 
Slovenia. Our findings suggest that severance pay non-performance has been a significant 
problem in Slovenia. In 2000, only two-thirds of total severance pay obligations were 
actually honored, a small portion of non-paid severance pay claims was reimbursed by the 
Guarantee Fund, and the rest – one-third of total obligations – was not paid at all. 
Moreover, we showed that while both men and women were equally affected, workers 
older than 40 years were more likely than younger ones to be confronted by severance pay 
non-performance. And, finally, we also found that among firms that incurred severance 
pay liabilities, larger and more productive firms were more likely to pay them out.  
 
Taken together, these findings shed rather negative light on severance pay as an income 
protection program for the unemployed. First, the program fails to protect a significant 
share of those who are legally entitled to such protection – even after the introduction of 
the Guarantee Fund. Second, the program is prone to creating inequities, as it 
disproportionally affected older workers. At the same time, our findings also provide some 
clues about how to make the program more effective.  The fact that less productive – and 
hence less profitable – firms are less likely to honor their obligations suggests that non-
performance is strongly related to the non-funded nature and limited risk-pooling of 
severance pay, and thus the recommendation of converting severance pay to a funded 
program.   
 
Let us conclude with recommendations for better coordinating severance pay with other 
income support systems for the unemployed. First, countries with both unemployment   10
insurance and severance pay programs (Slovenia being one of them) can save on costs 
without reducing insurance by better coordinating payments under the two programs. 
Namely, unemployment insurance eligibility rules could be adjusted so that insurance 
benefits would only start after the severance benefits “expire,” that is, after n months, if 
the individual received n monthly wages as the severance payment (such a program is in 
place in some developed countries, for example, in Canada – see Vodopivec 2004).  
 
Another possibility – explicitly addressing the non-performance problem – is the 
conversion of severance pay to pre-funded unemployment insurance savings accounts 
(UISAs), a reform implemented by Austria in 2002.
8 Besides correcting for the non-
performance problem, UISAs would improve efficiency by removing obstacles to labor 
market flexibility and reducing litigation costs. Lastly, the most radical option is the 
introduction of an integrated severance and UI system (Chilean model), consisting of two 
components: UISAs and a solidarity fund, with benefit recipients first drawing benefits 
from their UISAs and upon depletion, reverting to the solidarity fund (for details of the 
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Summary Findings
Combining information from the Firm Survey of Labor Costs with the
information about claims filed with the Guarantee Fund by workers
whose employers defaulted on their severance pay obligations, the
paper analyzes the so-called non-performance problem of severance
pay – the fact that coverage, and thus legal entitlement, does not
guarantee the actual receipt of the benefit – as experienced in Slovenia
in 2000.  The findings are threefold: (i) one-third of total obligations
incurred by firms failed to be honored and only a small portion of
defaulted severance pay claims was reimbursed by the Guarantee
Fund; (ii) while both men and women seem to be equally affected,
workers older than 40 were disproportionally represented among those
whose severance pay claims failed to be honored; and, (iii) among
firms that incurred severance pay liabilities, larger and more productive
firms were more likely to observe their fiduciary obligations and pay
them out. These findings corroborate the weaknesses of severance pay
as an income protection program, pointing to the large scale of the
non-performance problem and the inequities created by it.
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